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US PERPETUAL TRUSTS
L. W. Waggoner·
Lewis M Simes Professor ofLaw, University of Michigan Law School
In 2009, the UK reconfirmed its long-standing public policy against perpetual
trusts.' America has been moving in the opposite direction. Recent years have seen
a movement in the states to pass legislation allowing settlers to create family trusts
that can last fo rever or for several centuries.3
Sadly, and embarrassingly, the American perpetual-trust movement has not
been based on the merits of removing the traditional curb on excessive dead-hand
control. The policy issues associated with allowing perpetual trusts have not been
seriously discussed in the state legislatures. The driving force has been interstate
competition for trust business.4
The perpetual-trust movement was made possible by an inadvertent omission
in an act of the U.S. Congress. When family property in the US shifts from
generation to generation or bypasses a generation without incurring federal estate
or gift taxes, the void is filled by another tax called the federal generation-skipping
transfer tax (GST tax). The GST tax, however, contains an exemption. The GST
exemption allows settlers to create trusts that will never incur GST taxes. Congress
originally set the maximum exemption at $ 1 million ($2 million for a married
couple), but later pegged the exemption to the maximum estate tax exemption
which Congress increased, over time, to $3.5 million ($7 million for a married
couple). As the 2010 legislative session wound down, Congress increased the cap
again, this time to $5 million ($10 mi llion for a married couple), and indexed the
cap for intlation. 5 A GST-exempt trust retains its exemption no matter how much
the trust's post-creation value appreciates above the maximum exemption amount
When, in 1986, the Congress adopted the GST tax, it made a fatal mistake. It
omitted any durational limit on the GST exemption and instead relied on state
perpetuity law to control the duration of GST -exempt trusts. Although state
perpetuity law was then undergoing reform, the reforms retained the basic durational

Reporter. Restatement (Third) ofProperty: Wills and Other Donative Jransfers. Although parts of this essay are
based on the Restatement's discussion oflhe same topic. the essay itself has not been submitted to or approved by
the American Law Institute.
1
See Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 2009 s.S ( 12S-year limit). The Act is based on lhe proposal advanced
by the Law Commission, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Excessive Accumulations (HMSO, 1998) Law Com.
No.2SI .
2
E.g. Alaska, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia and Wisconsin.
3
E.g. 1,000 years in Colorado, Utah and Wyoming; SOO years in Arizona; 36S years in Nevada; 360 years in
Florida, Michigan and Tennessee.
4
See R.l-1. SilkofT and M.M. Schanzenbach, "Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: an Empirical Analysis
of Perpetuities and Taxes" (200S) liS Yale L.J. 3S6 at410; M.M. Schanzenbach and R.H. SitkofT, "Perpetuities or
Taxes? Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust" (2006) 27 Gardozo L.R. 246S.
5
Tax Relief, Unemploymentlnsurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of2010 ss.302(a)(l) and 303(b)(2),
http://finance.senate.gov/legislationldetailsl?id= I 0874ed6-5056-a032-52cd-99708697e.lflJ. As a result of a political
compromise, lhe increased cap is effective only through 2012, which means that Congress will need to revisit the
question atlhe end of2012. See also text accompanying fnn.49 and SO below. Had Congress not acted when it did,
the cap would have automatically reverted on January I, 20 II to the original amount of $1 million ($2 million for a
married couple).
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limit that has been part of Anglo-American law for centuries.6 State perpetuity
law, however, soon crumbled in the face of the lobbying efforts of local lawyers
and banks and other financial institutions who gradually began to see the marketing
potential of offering trusts that would be perpetually tax exempt.7 ln a 2004 Wells
Fargo Bank advertisement for South Dakota perpetual trusts, the bank proudly
proclaimed:
" Imagine a place where there is no rule against perpetuities. Where there is
no fiduciary income tax. And where a knowledgeable, experienced staff can
make a generation-skipping trust possible. Benefit from a team that offers
personal, professional management when you need it, now and in the future.'.a
The marketing worked. As the legislative momentum allowing perpetual trusts
began to build, the wealthy promptly responded by creating them. 9 An empirical
study based on data through 2003 established that the wealthy are creating
GST-exempt perpetual trusts in large numbers in the trust-friendly states.10
Considerable private wealth is pouring into GST-exempt trusts from out-of-state
settlors, thereby escaping federal transfer taxation for centuries and in some cases
forever. The states that attract the most trust business are those (such as South
Dakota) that do not tax trust income produced by funds originating from out of
state. 11 The authors of the empirical study found that roughly $ 100 billion in trust
assets had flowed into these states. 12 It seems safe to conclude that considerably
more wealth has moved into these states in the years following 2003. 13 Moreover,
the $1 00 billion figure undercounts the actual value of trust assets streaming into
these states, because the data sources on which the study was based were reports
6
See
7

L. W. Waggoner, "Wait and See: The New American Unifom1 Act on Perpetuities" ( 1987] C.L.J. 234.
The perpetual-trust movement began ta.king hold in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Before then, the Uniform Act
on Perpetuities. see fn.6 above, had become the majority rule in the US. But the Uniform Law Commission, nccusl.org,
which promulgated the Uniform Act, could not overcome the lobbying power of the local lawyers, banks and other
financial institutions that wanted to be able to offer and administer perpetually tax-exempt trusts. See R.D. Madoff,
Immortality and the Law: The Rising Power ofthe American Dead (Yale University Press, 20 I0), at pp.80-82 (noting
that "Congress created a marketing bonanza for banks and trust companies" and that perpetual trusts have "been
tremendously profitable for banks and other financial service companies, which can generate large fees administering
these long term trusts").
8
The advertisement, complete with a background image of a tranquil rural scene, was originally published in
various magazines for estate planning professionals and is reproduced in leading American casebooks. See J.
Dukeminier, R.H. Sitkoff and J. Lindgren, Wills. Trusts. and Estates, 8th edn (New York: Aspen, 2009), at p.908;
L.W. Waggoner, G.S. Alexander, M.L. Fellows and T.P. Gallanis, Family Property Law: Wills. Trusts, and Fuh1re
Interests, 4th edn (New York: Foundation Press, 2006), at p.l9-2. The Wells Fargo website today advertises perpetual
trusts more modestly, saying merely: "Protect your wealth for generations to come with a legacy trust". See hllps:l
lwww.wellsfargo.com/theprivatebankloursolutionslspecializedwea/tllsolutions.

9
Before enactment of the GST tax in 1986, it was possible to create perpetual trusts in a small number of American
states, but the evidence shows that settlers had little desire to create them. See Schanzenbach and Sitkoff, "Perpetuities
or Taxes?" (2006) 27 Cardozo L.R. 2465. It apparently takes a tax incentive to arouse dynastic impulses.
10
See Silkotr and Schanzenbach, "Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds" (2005) II 5 Yale L.J. 356.
11
See Silkoff and Schanzenbach, "Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds" (2005) 115 Yale L.J. 356 at 410.
States that levy an income tax on out-of-state trust funds experienced no observable increase in trust business. See
Sitkoff and Schanzenbacb, "Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds" (2005) 115 Yale L.J. 356 at 420.
12
See Silkoff and Schanzenbach, "Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds'' (2005) 115 Yale L.J. 356 at 359.
See also text accompanying fnn.SI and 52 below.
13
See Madoff, Immortality and the Law, 2010, at pp.SQ-82; Editorial, "America's Most Wealth Friendly States
Continue to Bid for Your Clients' Trust Business" (2010) The Trust Advisor Blog, hup:llthetrustadvisor.com/news
/states; K. M cNam~ "States Want Your Trust" Wall St. J., June 14.2010, at p.R4. In an obvious attempt to attract
offshore money, Bermuda recently authorised perpetual trusts, except as the trust relates to Bermuda land. See
Bermuda Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 2009, discussed favourably in T. Molloy and T. Graham, Editorial,
''Thousand year trusts?" (2009) IS Tnms & Trustees 7 10; 1-L Moss, "Bermuda-the Perpetuities and Accumulations
Act 2009" (2009) 15 Trusts & Trustees 719; R. Krebs, "Bermuda abolishes the rules against perpetuities and
accumulations" (2009) IS Trusts & Tnmees 722.
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from federal regulatory agencies. 14 These reports contain no data on trusts in which
the trustee is a family trust company, organised for the limited purpose of
administering trusts of one family. Family trust companies, which are becoming
popular vehicles for administering perpetual trusts of the very wealthy, •s are
regulated, if at aJJ, by state law! 6 not federa l law, and consequently do not report
to federal agencies.
Although a GST-exempt trust of a few million dollars represents a small portion
of the net worth of the truly wealthy, various estate planning techniques can be
used to leverage the amount exempted by an amount that substantially exceeds
the exemption's cap. 17 And the assets, once in the trust, can be invested in vehicles
not normally available to ordinary investors. For example, the trustee, which can
be a family trust company or a financial institution under a directed-trust
arrangement, 18 can be authorised to purchase or retain assets such as second-to-die
life insurance policies, start-up businesses, and minority or non-voting interests
in existing family businesses at discounted values through note-sales or other
devices.19 The trustee can also be authorised to purchase or retain property such
as vacation homes and private airplanes for the tax-free use of the beneficiaries.
ln addition, the trustee can be authorised to hire sophisticated investment managers
and invest in assets not traded in the public securities markets, assets such as hedge
funds, private equity, venture capital funds and real estate. 2° Finally, generation
after generation can have their interests insulated from creditors through the use
of spendthrift clauses. 21
One wonders whether the state legislators who vote to authorise perpetual trusts
and the wealthy who create them have thought through what they are allowing or
putting in place. 22 The perpetual trusts that are now in existence are only in their
first or second decade, so experience with them as they continue past the boundary
set by traditional perpetuity Jaw is lacking. Nevertheless, some predictions can be
made, since the prototypical perpetual trust is a discretionary trust for the benefit
of the settlor's descendants from time to time living forever (or for several
centuries).23 With each step down the generational ladder, the settlor's genetic
14
Sec Sitkoff and Schanzenbach, "Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds" (2005) 115 Yale L.J. 356 at
pp.387- 388.
ISSee I.J. Goodwin, "How the Rich Stay Rich: Using a Family Trust Company to Secure a Family Fortune" (20 I0)
40 Seton Hall L.R. 467, noting at467-468 that family trust companies are generally thought to be appropriate only
for families with a net worth of at least $200 million.
16
See Goodwin, "How the Rich Stay Rich" (2010) 40 Seton Hall L.R. 467 at 474-475, noting that family trust
companies are lightly regulated by state law in some states and unregulated by state law in other states.
17
See Goodwin. "How the Rich Stay Rich" (2010) 40 Seton Hall L.R. 467 at 492; Madoff, Immortality and the
Law. 2010. at pp.62-63.
18
1n a directed trust, the financial institution provides custody and account statement services, but another party
(sometimes called a trust advisor or a trust protector) makes some or all of the investment and distributive decisions.
Sec, e.g. D.A. Diamond and T.A. Flubacher, "The Trustee's Role in Directed Trusts" (Dec. 201 0) Trusts & Estates
Maqazine 24.
1
See MadofT, Immortality and the Law, 2010, at pp.76-85; Goodwin, "How the Rich Stay Rich" (2010) 40 Seton
Hall L.R. 467 at 489-497 (stating at 492 that the note-sale device can be used to leverage the exemption by as much
as ten times the exemption's cap).
20
See Goodwin, "How the Rich Stay Rich" (20 I 0) 40 Seton II all L.R. 467 at 508.
21
See Madotf, Immortality and the Law, 20 I 0. Spendthrift clauses in the fonn of disabling restraints on alienation
are valid and enforceable in almost all American states. See, e.g. Broadway Nat'/ Bank v Adams ( 1882) 133 Mass.
I 70; Restatement (Third) ofTrusts s.58.
22
For perspective. one notes, with some disquiet, that the Low Quarterly Review has only been publishing for a
mere 127 years and the Harvard Law Review for a mere 124 years.
23
See R. W. Nenno, Delaware Dynasty 1h1sts. Total Return Trusts, and Asset Protection Trusts (Thomson/West,
2006), at pp.l82- 184.
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relationship with the descendant-beneficiaries declines rather precipitously. On
average, and disregarding nongenetic descendants such as adoptees, a settlor's
genetic relationship with his or her descendants is cut in half at each succeeding
generation. At the 14th generation (i.e. the generation born about 300 years after
the settlor's death), the settlor's genetic relattionship is reduced to about 0.0061
per cent, which--due to our common origins- is about the same relationship one
bas with any randomly selected member of the population.24
As the settlor's genetic relationship with the beneficiaries declines, the number
of descendant-beneficiaries proliferates.25 Some 150 years since its creation, a
GST-exernpt perpetual trust could have about 450 living beneficiaries; after 250
years, more than 7,000 Jiving beneficiaries; after 350 years, about 114,500 living
beneficiaries. 26 This means that 350 years after creation, Wembley Stadium would
not be large enough to hold them all. Nor, in America, would the Rose Bowl or
any other sports stadium. The beneficiaries would have to book Rungrado May
Day Stadium in Pyongyang, North Korea or Salt Lake Stadium in Kolkata, India
for a meeting. 27
As the trust drifts deeper and deeper into its second and third centuries and
beyond, and long after the settlor and the attorney responsible for proposing and
drafting the trust have passed away, the beneficiaries will, to be sure, share a
common ancestor, but their common ancestor will be very remote and they will
have branched into thousands of individual three- or four-generation families
basically unaware of their relationship with all but the closest of the other branches.
Readers of this essay can be expected to know their brothers and sisters (at least
those ofthe whole blood28) and their descendants, probably their first cousins and
their descendants, and possibly even their second cousins and some or all of their
descendants. But few would know or know of their th ird or fourth cousins, let
alone the tens of thousands of their remote relatives in more distant branches. To
pick up on the language of the Wells Fargo advertisement/ 9 imagine a perpetual
trust in which the more-than- I 00,000 living beneficiaries include US President
Barack Obama and his descendants, and former US President George HW Bush
and his descendants (including former US President George W Bush). Or, a
perpetual trust in which the more-than-1 00,000 living beneficiaries include US
President Obama and his descendants, and former US Vice-President Richard
Cheney and his descendants. We11, both trusts would exist and sti11 be operating
today if Samuel Hinckley, who died in Massachusetts in 1662, had created a

24
SeeJ.H. Beckstrom, "Sociobiology and Intestate Wealth Transfers" ( 1981) 76 N.W U. L. Rev. 216 at 232, citing
R. Dawkins, The SelfiSh Gene (Oxford University Press, 1976), at p.l 00.
25
See Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, Vol.3, introductory note to Ch.27
(Philadelphia: ALI, 2011); L.W. Waggoner, "Curtailing Dead-Hand Control: The American Law Institute Declares
the Perpetual-Trust Movement Ill Advised" (20 I 0) University ofMichigan Public Law Working Paper No.l99, http:

//pafers.ssrn.com/so/3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= I 614934.

2 See Waggoner, ''Curtailing Dead-Hand Control" (201 0) University of Michigan Public Law Working Paper
No.l99. The projections are based on the following averages: life expectancy of 75 years, two children per couple
and 25-year separation between generations. The projections arc also based on the assumption that the trust was
created when the settlor bad two children and four grandchildren.
27
See http://en. wikipedia.orglwiki/List_of_stadiums_by_capaci1y.
28 In an age of multiple marriages and other formal and informal multiple relationships, some might not know or
know of all of their half brothers and sisters. ln the 1990s, several men claimed to be half brothers of then US President
Bill Clinton. See, e.g. J. Gross, "Clinton's Lost Half Brother? To Neighbors, He's Just Leon", N.Y. Times, June 22,
I 993, at http:/lwww. nyt imes.com/1993/0612 2/us/c/i nton-s-lost-half-brother-to-neighbors-he-s-just-leon. html.
29

See fn.8 above.
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perpetual trust for his descendants/ 0 and if Mareen Duvall, who died in Maryland
31
in 1694, had created a perpetual trust for her descendants.
Four hundred and fifty years after a GST-exempt perpetual trust is created, the
number of living beneficiaries of that one trust could rise to J .8 million. Yes, 1.8
million beneficiaries of one trust, each with standing to bring a lawsuit against the
trustee for violation of any of the trustee's fiduciary duties.
A trustee operates under a strict duty to distribute trust funds only to those
persons who qualify as beneficiaries.32 The trustee who makes a mistaken
distribution to a non-beneficiary "is liable although [the trustee] reasonably believes
that the person to whom [the trustee] pays or conveys is the beneficiary".33 Because
a trustee acts at peril for mistaken distributions,34 the trustee must investigate
whether a person who claims to be a beneficiary does in fact qualify. If, however,
a trust were to have thousands or tens of thousands of potential beneficiaries,
centuries removed from the settlor by descent, the task of ascertaining and verifying
which persons qualify as beneficiaries will be enormously complex and expensive.
A trustee also operates under the duty of impartiality, which provides that:
" ... in investing, protecting, and distributing the trust estate, and in other
administrative functions, the trustee must act impartially and with due regard
for the diverse beneficial interests created by the terms of the trust". 35
The Restatement of Trusts provides that the duty of impartiality:
" ... is important not only, for example, in balancing the naturally conflicting
concerns of life and remainder beneficiaries but also whenever multiple
income beneficiaries have significantly differing needs and tax positions, or
when multiple remainder beneficiaries have significantLy different objectives
and risk tolerance."36
Moreover, in discharging the duty of impartiality:
" ... a trustee will often find it desirable, and sometimes important or even
necessary, to consult with beneficiaries and obtain information from them
concerning their financial needs and circumstances and perhaps their
preferences concerning matters of trust administration".37
Just how the trustee of a perpetual trust with hundreds of thousands ofbeneficiaries
with conflicting interests will be able to consult them appropriately, investigate
their "needs and circumstances", and give due "regard" to the interests of each, is
difficult to comprehend. The answer perhaps is that artificial intelligence
technology, now in its infancy, or future technologies yet to be imagined, will in
30

See New England Historic Genealogical Society, hup:/lwww.newenglandancestors.org/about/7320.asp.
Sec New England Historic Genealogical Society, fn. 30 above. In the UK, Queen Elizabeth II and Prime Minister
David Cameron share a remote common ancestor ond are fifth cousins rwice removed. See A. Pierce, "Cameron's
Royal Link Makes Him a True Blue", The Times, December 5, 2005, hllp:l/www.timesonline.co.uk/tollnl!lvslpolitics
31

/article745903.ece.
32
See Restatement (Second) ofTrusts s.226.
33
See Restatement (Second) of Trusts s.226, at Comment b.
34
See National AcademyofSciences v Cambridge Tn~t Co ( 1976) 346 N.E. 2d 879 at 885 (prior judicial accountings
re~ned

to assess liability against trustee for mistaken payments).

Restatement (Third) ofTrusts s.79(a).
36
Restatement (Third) of Trusts s.79(b), at Comment a.
37
Restatement (Third) ofTntsts s.79(b), at Comment d.
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time take over more and more of the management and distributive functions with
less and less human oversight, but perhaps not. All of this is part of the vast
unknown. One certainty is that the costs oftrust administration, however significant,
will be payable from the trust property. 38
Speaking of the trustee's fiduciary duties raises another matter that should be
of concern to the state legislators who vote to authorise perpetual trusts and the
settlors who create them: who is going to serve as trustee over these vast intervals?
In an era in which banks and other financial institutions go out of business, merge
or are taken over by other banks or financial institutions, the bank or financial
institution originally selected will not likely continue in anything like its present
form for the next 200 years, 300 years, or for infinity. 39 Over vast intervals such
as these, the identity, location, capabilities and expertise of the trustee wiUiikely
change many times over. Trustee turnover is enough of a problem for a trust whose
duration is within the traditional perpetuity limit of 100 years or so. The problem
will surely be more acute for a trust spanning several centuries or lasting forever.
Perhaps the problem of trustee turnover is of Less concern in the case of a family
trust company, if the only thing that is meant by trustee turnover is the name of
the entity.40 Staffing and the need to keep up technologically are other matters.
Over time, a family trust company will experience the same turnover and expansion
in personnel as an institutional trustee, and will have the same needs for constantly
updating the technology required to keep up with so many beneficiaries. A fam ily
trust company, moreover, wi ll not be as well capitalised as a larger, federally
regulated institutional trustee. As the beneficiaries grow into the tens of thousands
and divide into thousands of branches mostly unknown to one another, conflicts
over management and distribution seem inevitable, and successful lawsuits could
very welJ bankrupt a family trust company. In the end, whether the trustee is a
financ ial institution whose trust services are open to the general public or a family
trust company open only to family members, the problem of trustee turnover will
be about the same. The personnel and technology necessary to administer a trust
with 15 or fewer beneficiaries (two children, four grandchildren, and as many as
eight great-grandchildren) will not look anything like the personnel and technology
necessary to manage a trust with 100,000 or more beneficiaries. The trustee,
whatever its form, will become a much different entity than the one initially
entrusted with the settlor's fortune.
Another important reason for maintaining a reasonable limit on dead-band
control is to ensure that full control of encumbered property will be sh ifted
periodically to the living, free of restrictions imposed centuries earlier by the
original settlor. The living can then use the property as they wish, including
re-transferring the property into new trusts with up-to-date provisions.41 By way
38 See Restatement (Third) a/Trusts s.38.

39

ln late 2010, one of the prominent US trust companies that administers perpetuallrusts, the Wilmington Trust
Company ofWilmington, Delaware, was acquired by the M&T Ba:nk Corp headquartered in Buffalo, New York. See
J.D. Epstein, "Serious problems forced Wilmington Trust to sell out", November 28, 2010, http://www.buffa/onews
.com/city/communities/downtown!article267529.ece. Wilmington Trust's serious problems were due to bad loa:ns,
not to lack of profitability of the lrust department. The M&T Bank Corp has itself gone through many mergers,
ac~isitions and name changes. See its history as reported on its website at hllp:/lir.mandtbank.coml.
Family trust companies are described in the text accompanying fnn.l5 and 16 above.
41
SeeR. Deech, "Lives in Being Revived" ( 1981) 97 L.Q.R. 593 at 594 ("If a settlor or testator had total liberty
to dispose of hi s property a:mong future beneficiaries, the recipients, being fettered by his wishes, would never enjoy
that same freedom in their tum. The liberty to ma:ke fresh rearrangements of assets is necessary not only in order to
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of example, consider one set of provisions that are likely to become increasingly
obsolete as time goes by-family class-gift definitions. A perpetual trust drafted
today might appear to be flexible if it grants the trustee discretionary powers to
distribute income or principal among the settlor's descendants from time to time
living. Such a trust, however, will often define the class of descendants according
to time-of-creation standards, standards that run the serious risk of becoming out
of date as concepts of family change over time. No trust drafted in 1650 or earlier
could have contained provisions anticipating the possibility of adopted children,42
children of assisted reproduction, or children born to a surrogate mother, much
less second-parent adoptions or posthumously conceived children. Likewise, no
perpetual trust drafted today will be able to anticipate concepts of family and
descent as they change and adjust over vast intervals in the future. Here are just a
few questions. WiU human cloning become possible, legal and routine? Will the
institution of marriage flourish or become obsolete? Will average life expectancy
increase so much that five- or six-generation famiHes become commonplace?
These and other questions that we cannot now even imagine are troublesome
enough for a trust whose duration is within the traditional perpetuity limit of 100
years or so. But the problem will be more troublesome for a trust spanning several
centuries or lasting forever.
In the end, no one-no matter how prescient-can imagine what society
(including its legal institutions and concepts of family) will be like in the 22nd,
23rd or 24th centuries and beyond, any more than the most prescient in the 17th
century could have imagined what society is like today. If the past is any guide to
the future, even the terminology in an early 21st century perpetual trust will seem
as archaic to those in these distant centuries as the terminology in a 17th century
document appears to us today.
Will anything be done about the matter? At the 20 l 0 annual meeting of the
American Law Institute (ALI or Institute),43 the Institute declared the perpetual-trust
movement ill advised 44 and proposed limiting trust duration to two younger
generations.4s But even the prestige of the ALI is overmatched in the state
legislatures by the lobbying power of the lawyers who have a stake in the fees they
can generate from drafting perpetual trusts and of the banks and other financial
institutions that have a financial stake in the higher profits they expect to reap from
attracting and administering perpetual trusts.46
be rid of irksome conditions attached by earlier donors to the enjoyment of income but also in order to be able to
manouevre in ihe light of new tax laws, changes in the nature of the property and in the personal circumstances of
the beneficiaries, unforeseeable by the best-intentioned and most perspicacious of donors.").
42
Adoption was first authorised in England in 1926. See Adoption of Children Act 1926. In the United States,
adoption began to be authorised in the mid- 19th century. See E.W. Carp, Family Matters: Secrecy and Disclosure in
the History of Adoption (Harvard University Press, 1998), at p.l l .
43
See hup://ww.v.ali.orgl.
44
See Waggoner, "Curtailing Dead-Hand Control" (2010) University of Michigan Public Law Working Paper
No.l99. The floor vote was unanimous.
4
s In general terms, the Institute's new approach provides that a trust or other donative disposition of property is
subject to judicial modification to the extent that the trust does not terminate on or before the expiration of the
perpetuity period. The perpetuity period expires at the death of the last living measuring life, defined as a group
composed of the settlor and the beneficiaries of the disposition who are no more than two generations younger than
the settlor. For more on the Institute's new approach to perpetuities, see L. W. Waggoner, ''The American Law Institute
Proposes a New Approach to Perpetuities: Limiting the Dead Hand to Two Younger Generations" (20 I0) University
ofMichigan Public Law Working Paper No.200, hllp:/lssrn.com/abstract= 1614936.
46
See Madoff,lmmortality and the Law, 20 I0; S. Martin, "Sante Fe Trust Eyes South Dakota for Dynastic Trusts"
(2011) The Trust Advisor Blog, http://thetrustadvisor.com/newslsamafe; "Expert Says Delaware and South Dakota
Trust Providers Should Boost Fees" (20 10) The Trust Advisor Slog, http://thetmstadvisor.com/practice-management
(2011) 127 L.Q.R. July C 2011 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
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47

Only Congress can put a stop to the perpetual-trust movement. A 2005 staff
report of the US Joint Committee on Taxation proposed a durational limit on the
GST exemption coincident with the ALl perpetuity proposal, i.e. a
two-younger-generation limit.48 Whether Congress, distracted as it is with so many
other matters, will ever reverse what it has thoughtlessly wrought remains to be
seen. Congress made no attempt to do so in the tax bill it passed in the waning
days of20 I 0 and, in a controversial move, exacerbated the problem by increasing
49
the cap to $5 million ($1 0 million for a married couple).
As a result of a political compromise, Congress provided that the larger cap
expi res at the end of 2012, after which the cap wi ll automatically revert to the
original amount of $ 1 million ($2 mill ion for a married couple). so Although the
risk that Congress will allow that to happen appears negligible, the
uncerta inty-slig ht as it is- might motivate some of the super rich to take
advantage of the 20 11 to 2012 window by pouring more wealth into perpetual
trusts than they might otherwise have done. As one prominent estate planning
attorney noted:
" With a GST exemption of$5 million, the bam door [is now] open for very
high net worth clients to lock in huge savings in transfer taxes, potentially
for many generations." 51
And as another commentator noted:
" Billions of dollars of assets were no doubt removed from future estate taxes
through [exempt trusts for grandchi ldren and more remote generations]; I
know of more than $ 1 billion in New York City alone.'''~
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The fact is that Congress will, at the latest, revisit the question as the time for
expiration of the larger cap grows closer. One hopes that when it does, Congress
wilJ not only reconsider the amount of the cap but will also realise how much
revenue has been lost and will continue to be lost by the absence of a durational
limit. A welcome by-product of a durationallimit, especially the one proposed by
the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation,53 would be the demise of the US
perpetual-trust movement. <!Joo S4
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